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Foundational and Instrumental 
Design Theory
Per Galle
Introduction: Two Questions about Design Theory
It seems fairly commonplace that the way designers conceive of the 
nature and purpose of design will affect their practice. To illustrate, 
consider three designers: For the first, design is a crusade against 
boredom and indifference; for the second, the goal is to minimize 
a cost-benefit ratio; and design for the third empowers socially 
disadvantaged people. Each of these designers would probably 
come up with rather different proposals even if working from the 
same brief. No doubt, the nature of such direct connections between 
individual designers’ conceptions of design and their practice is 
complex and interesting. However, what I consider here is a different 
way in which basic conceptions may affect design practice: indirectly, 
via research.
Just as designers produce design proposals, design researchers 
produce design theory. And just as the raison d’être for design is that 
(some) proposals give rise to artifacts that people appreciate and 
use, the raison d’être for design research is that (some) design theory 
conveys facts and possibilities that facilitate, accelerate, or improve 
design practice, if taken into account by a designer. I call such 
theory instrumental (design) theory. Examples include theory about 
design processes (method if actions are prescribed); about function or 
aesthetics of particular artifact types; and about historical, cultural, 
and technical contexts of design.
Furthermore, just as designers have conceptions about the 
nature and purpose of design that affect the proposals they produce, 
so too, I submit, do design researchers have such conceptions that 
affect the instrumental theory they produce; thereby, they indirectly 
affect design practice—provided such instrumental theory is 
adopted by designers. This proviso is crucial. A designer who 
thinks of design as an artistic endeavor, for example, is not likely 
to adopt an instrumental theory for optimizing technical efficiency. 
For an instrumental theory to be adopted by a designer, the basic 
conceptions of the nature and purpose of design on which the theory 
was based must match those of the designer. If the basic conceptions 
underlying instrumental theory are left implicit or remain unclear, 
even designers who could benefit from adopting it may ignore the 
theory, or regard it with suspicion. Therefore, instrumental design 
theory should not stand alone, but should be supported by theory 
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expressing its underlying conceptions about the nature and purpose 
of design—what, accordingly, I call foundational (design) theory.1
So foundational and instrumental theory should be developed 
in a coordinated manner. This coordination does not mean, however, 
that every design researcher must produce both kinds of theory, nor 
indeed that even the most specialized instrumental theory must 
be supported by an equally specialized foundational theory of its 
own. On the contrary, workers in “basic research” might see it as 
their mission to produce whatever foundational theory is needed 
to support instrumental theory produced by colleagues in “applied 
research,” while the latter should consciously and critically use 
foundational theory already available. To prevent excessive fragmen-
tation of design as an intellectual discipline, only a limited number 
of incompatible foundational theories should be tolerated, so as to 
reflect whatever genuine disagreement exists in the field.
In the remainder of this paper, I explore the idea of 
coordinated theory development, focusing on two questions: 
(1) What, more precisely, is the relationship between founda-
tional and instrumental design theory? 
(2) Given the nature of that relationship, what is good founda-
tional design theory? Instrumental theory is “good,” 
by definition, in the sense that it “conveys facts and 
possibilities that facilitate, accelerate, or improve design 
practice, if taken into account by a designer.” This explains 
the limitation of the second question to foundational theory.
To provide empirical background for the two questions, I first 
revisit three landmarks of the design research literature. Herbert 
Simon’s book, The Sciences of the Artificial,2 and Donald Schön’s, The 
Reflective Practitioner–How Professionals Think in Action,3 are widely 
recognized in the design research community as cornerstones of two 
major “schools of thought” (although both books deal with a wider 
range of phenomena than design). Arguably, each of these books has 
initiated or at least epitomized a design research paradigm, in Kuhn’s 
sense.4 My third landmark is Klaus Krippendorff’s more recent book, 
The Semantic Turn—A New Foundation for Design.5 Whether it will 
create a paradigm of its own remains to be seen, but it certainly 
aspires to do so. None of the three authors distinguishes founda-
tional and instrumental theory in quite the way I propose to do. 
However, I show that they can be read and compared in the light of 
that distinction. Let us keep the two focus questions in mind, so as to 
consider some answers to them toward the end of the paper.
Simon: Design is Problem Solving
Simon defines design very broadly: “Everyone designs who 
devises courses of action aiming at changing existing situations into 
preferred ones.” And “so construed,” he says, “design is the core of 
all professional training; [what] distinguishes the professions from 
the sciences.”6 These professions include engineering, architecture, 
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business, education, law, and medicine. However, Simon’s idea of 
design soon narrows considerably because, according to him, solving 
a design problem amounts to finding a solution to a constraint 
satisfaction problem—and sometimes maximizing an “objective 
function” as well, thereby turning the problem into an optimization 
problem. A solution is given by a combination of values of a set of 
“command variables,” representing the sought-after artifact in its 
environment. Constraints on the values may represent natural laws, 
or goals to be attained.7
This brief outline roughly suggests what I see as Simon’s 
foundational theory. At a more political level, he laments what he 
sees as an unfortunate tendency of universities and professional 
schools, after World War II, to replace the teaching of design with the 
teaching of “applied” natural sciences: physics and mathematics in 
engineering schools, biology in medical schools, finite mathematics 
in business schools. This development, he says, was driven by 
a hankering after academic respectability, combined with a lack 
of respect for traditional design theory, which was perceived as 
“intellectually soft, intuitive, informal, and cook-booky.”8 However, 
despite the label of “applied,” such sciences do little to provide 
students with the design competence they need. So to resume their 
responsibility for relevant training, while achieving the desired 
academic respectability, Simon suggests that professional schools 
introduce and teach a new kind of design theory: “a science of 
design, a body of intellectually tough, analytic, partly formalizable, 
partly empirical, teachable doctrine about the design process”9—his 
version of what I call instrumental theory.
Simon develops no instrumental theory but recommends a 
number of topics for a design curriculum: utility theory, statistical 
decision theory, computational methods of optimization and 
constraint satisfaction, formal logics, and more. In the third edition of 
his book (cited here), he notes that some steps in this direction have 
been made, under the influence of the first edition, and contends that 
“[t]he need to make design theory explicit and precise in order to 
introduce computers into the process has been the key to establishing 
its academic acceptability.”10
This research paradigm of technical rationality underlies a 
huge amount of design research, particularly in the field known as 
“design computing.” I do not attempt a review here. Suffice it to note 
that, after spending many years working with design computing 
under the research paradigm represented by Simon, I eventually 
became disenchanted with it. One reason was its underlying 
assumption that a design problem can be specified with a high 
degree of completeness prior to the “search for solutions.” As my 
awareness of this assumption grew, I regarded it with mounting 
suspicion because it seemed at odds not only with my own 
experience, but also with persistently reported observations about 
the tendency of design problem and design solution to “co-evolve.”11 
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Furthermore, the formalization of design solutions in terms of a given 
set of “command variables” (even if organized into sophisticated 
data structures, “objects,” or clauses of logic programming) seemed 
to me increasingly a straitjacket to the agile creativity called for in 
real-world situations. Thus, notwithstanding the benefits that formal 
methods offer in specialized contexts (e.g., layout and routing of 
integrated circuits), I’ve come to believe that, on the whole, Simon’s 
idea of a new general “science of design” (e.g., instrumental design 
theory) along these lines is a dead end.12
Schön: Design is Conversation with the Materials of a Situation
Like Simon, Donald Schön leveled a severe criticism against profes-
sional training in the United States after World War II. However, 
what Schön saw as the problem was not undue reliance on applied 
science, but a more general “positivist epistemology of practice”13 
that led precisely to the kind of technical rationality advocated by 
Simon. His main objection to Simon’s proposed “science of design” 
is that it “can be applied only to well-formed problems extracted 
from situations of practice.”14 According to Schön, this is seldom 
possible because, as he puts it, “[i]n the varied topography of profes-
sional practice […] there is a swampy lowland where situations are 
confusing ‘messes’ incapable of technical solution.” He admits that 
there is also “a high, hard ground” where problems are amenable 
to technical methods. However, such problems “are often relatively 
unimportant […], while in the swamp are the problems of greatest 
human concern.”15 Schön describes this challenge to developers 
of instrumental design theory as the dilemma of rigor or relevance. 
Either you can apply sophisticated technical methods to relatively 
unimportant problems; or you can face the “messy but crucially 
important” problems that leave you to your own devices of 
“experience, trial and error, intuition and muddling through.”16 The 
“messiness” involves such phenomena as “complexity, uncertainty, 
instability, uniqueness, and value-conflict,” which do not fit methods 
of technical rationality.17
For Schön, good design is a prime example of reflective 
practice:18 the flexible process of trial and error that a practitioner 
engages in to deal with the “messy” problems of life. To cite Schön’s 
characteristic phrase that summarizes his foundational theory, design 
is “a conversation with the materials of a situation.”19 The designer 
“shapes the situation, in accordance with his initial appreciation 
of it, the situation ‘talks back,’ and he responds to the situation’s 
back-talk.”20 This conversation should be “reflective” in that the 
designer is critically aware of his or her current understanding of 
problem and actions, and is ready to revise that understanding. 
Schön develops this account in detail, notably by means of an 
elaborate case study of architectural design.21 Rather than an abstract 
and self-sufficient “science of design,” above and beyond practice, 
Schön seeks “an epistemology of practice implicit in the artistic, 
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intuitive processes which some practitioners do bring to situations 
of uncertainty, instability, uniqueness, and value conflict.”22
When it comes to a possible instrumental design theory, 
Schön’s view is more balanced than Simon’s. He acknowledges the 
value of applied science to “some parts of some practices,”23 yet he 
strongly opposes the conventional (positivist) separation of research 
from practice (as well as means from ends, and knowing from doing).24 
He proposes a radical change in our conception of research versus 
practice, which makes it difficult to distinguish instrumental theory 
from practice itself. For, according to Schön, a good practitioner, 
whenever faced with the messiness and uncertainty of a unique 
professional situation, is triggered into “reflection-in-action,” which 
involves undertaking “on-the-spot experiments” that conform to 
certain standards of “rigor” of their own25—standards that signif-
icantly depart from those of conventional experiments under 
laboratory conditions. Schön accepts these alternative standards 
without qualms, which leads him to the remarkable conclusion that 
“research is an activity of practitioners.”26 The controversial nature of 
that view is exacerbated by Schön’s discussion of the practitioner’s 
on-the-spot experiments in such terms as “the sort of science that 
does not appear in the scientific journals.”27 I suspect this idea may 
have contributed to the widespread confusion about “practice-based 
research” in design, and may have fueled the heated debate that still 
goes on about whether design practice, in itself, should count as 
research in academic contexts.28
This being as it may, Schön nevertheless adds that “there are 
kinds of research which can be undertaken outside the immediate 
context of practice in order to enhance the practitioner’s capacity for 
reflection-in-action”—reflective research, he calls it.29 And just as Simon 
saw elements of a “science of design” emerge, so Schön holds that 
there are four kinds of reflective research, “each of which already 
exists at least in embryo.” Here, I discuss the four kinds of research 
in the context of design and evaluate them only for our current 
purposes—namely, as proposals for instrumental design theory.
(1) “Frame analysis”30 is a study of how practitioners frame 
(e.g., understand and state) the problems they deal with, and the 
roles they assume. For example, at a general level, an architect may 
see himself as a historicist, a modernist, or an advocate of good 
craftsmanship. At a particular level, one frame (e.g., guiding idea) 
for addressing a site-planning problem might be the effect that slopes 
of the site have on the geometry of clusters of buildings placed along 
them.31 Each such frame directs the designer’s focus of attention and 
shapes his or her actions in a certain way. Often the frames are not 
consciously acknowledged, so bringing them to light can help practi-
tioners actively construct their professional reality, rather than taking 
some version of it for granted.
It seems both desirable and feasible that frame awareness be 
kindled in design students during their training. One way to do 
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so would be by asking them to reflect on and make explicit their 
own framing of a particular project, and to explain how these basic 
assumptions and guiding ideas affect design products. This exercise, 
in effect, amounts to asking the students to produce instrumental 
theory of their own. Another way would be to expose students to 
research by others on the history of existing artifacts, where the 
research aim is to reveal how the artifacts were shaped by their 
designer’s (implicit) framing. (This paper may be seen, incidentally, 
as an attempt to analyze basic frames of design research—its founda-
tional theories—rather than design practice.)
(2) According to Schön, “repertoire-building research”32 
would help practitioners become familiar with a stock of precedents 
or exemplars to which situations encountered in practice may be seen 
as analogues and that may provide guidance in dealing with those 
situations. For example, an architect’s repertoire might comprise 
historical buildings and Italian hill town architecture, as well as 
patterns of reasoning used in certain situations.
Case studies as part of a design curriculum might draw on 
research on design history, which would thus provide instrumental 
theory by contributing to the students’ “repertoires” (in addition to 
enhancing their frame awareness, as already discussed).
(3) “Research on fundamental methods of inquiry and 
overarching theories”33 is the examination of episodes of practice 
so as to discover how competent practitioners overcome difficult 
situations by restructuring (reframing) them in the light of theories 
from apparently unrelated domains. As an example, Schön describes 
how a product development team was trying to devise a new kind of 
synthetic bristle for paintbrushes, but did not make headway until 
one member saw the paintbrush as a kind of pump, and brought 
pumping-theory to bear on the case.34
Schön’s discussion is rather sketchy at this point and unrelated 
to design; but if I interpret him correctly, the third kind of “reflective 
research” is subsumed under the more general fourth kind.
(4) “Research on the process of reflection-in-action”35 is a 
systematic recording (by means of “protocols”), observation, and 
analysis of actual practice, possibly involving some degree of 
intervention by the researcher.
The case studies reported in his book exemplify this 
approach—notably the architectural site planning case36 in which 
Quist, a teacher of architecture, reviews work by Petra, one of his 
students. Their conversation and sketching during the review 
session was meticulously analyzed and interpreted in terms of 
Schön’s conceptual apparatus of “reflective practice.”37 This case 
study became a model for many subsequent protocol studies of 
designers’ work.38 A good example is the study of student design 
teams by Valkenburg and Dorst, where Schön’s terminology is 
explicitly used and clarified.39 No doubt exposure to results of such 
studies can prepare prospective designers for the “messiness” of the 
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“swampy lowlands” of design practice in a way that supplements 
and reinforces their own evolving experience. In this sense, Schön’s 
fourth kind of reflective research has something valuable to offer by 
way of generating instrumental design theory.
Krippendorff: Design is Making Sense of Things
The level of ambition of Krippendorff’s book is daunting. His 
opening sentence reads: “This book introduces a new way of concep-
tualizing design as a professional practice and as an activity that is 
constitutive of human beings generally.”40 As clearly as one could 
wish, this statement sets the goal of developing a foundational 
theory. The essence of Krippendorff’s theory is partly suggested 
by his dictum: “Design is making sense of things.”41 He urges that 
the design profession undergo a semantic turn away from merely 
“shaping the appearance of mechanical products” to “conceptu-
alizing artifacts, material or social, that have a chance of meaning 
something to their users.”42 The semantic turn is a turn away from 
“technology-centered design” toward “human-centered design.”43 
Schön’s foundational theory was human-centered, too, by virtue 
of its focus on the designer. Krippendorff’s theory more broadly 
emphasizes the importance of “stakeholders” in design, including 
the users of design products.
His semantic turn is supposed to do for design what the 
linguistic turn did for philosophy in the twentieth century. The 
linguistic turn in philosophy involved a re-orientation toward 
language as a source of insight into philosophical problems.44 Given 
this view, the importance of discourses (roughly, socially institution-
alized ways of thinking, talking, and acting) becomes evident, and 
Krippendorff’s explicit aim on behalf of the design profession is to 
make it “redesign” itself by “starting to talk differently about design, 
the world it can affect, what to do, and how to proceed”45—in short, 
by consciously changing its professional discourse so as to bring 
about the semantic turn. In this respect, Krippendorff’s endeavor 
is similar in nature to what Schön called “frame analysis,” but in 
Krippendorff the exercise is not to be undertaken at the scale of a 
single design problem, design project, or designer, but at the scale 
of the entire profession.
The semantic turn itself rests on the “axiomatic” assumption 
of human-centered design: that “meaning matters more than 
function” (inherited from product semantics).46 Construing the import 
of Krippendorff’s semantic turn as a foundational design theory, it 
seems fair to say that, in accordance with its axiom, it amounts to 
regarding design as a matter of proposing realizable artifacts in such a 
way as to anticipate and justify what they will mean to others47—that is, 
what their “technological, social, and cultural consequences” will be 
to the stakeholders.48 According to Krippendorff, designers should 
lay claim to expertise in a “second-order understanding” of artifacts: 
an understanding of how others understand artifacts.49 Such “extraor-
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dinary sensitivity to what artifacts mean to others, users, bystanders, 
critics […] has always been an important but rarely explicitly 
acknowledged competence” of designers, he says; it is an expertise 
they should now bring into focus and promote as something that 
no other profession offers, and they should appreciate it as “a solid 
rhetorical ground from which to justify their work.”50
Krippendorff unfolds this foundational theory at length in 
terms of the meaning of artifacts in relation to their use, to language, 
to their life cycle, and to “an ecology of artifacts.” Eventually, he 
proposes a “new science for design”51—an instrumental theory—in 
a manner similar to what Simon and Schön had done. He offers a 
list of five features of his “science for design.”52 The list may seem 
rather speculative at first, but subsequently Krippendorff associates 
a number of methods with each feature. In brief summary, the features 
and methods are as follows:
(1) Design is concerned with what does not yet exist, with 
innovation and “making things happen.” Thus, the science for design 
should not mimic methods and traditions of natural sciences, which 
are “searching for generalizable patterns that existed in the past.” 
Associated methods include brainstorming, creativity-enhancing 
techniques, and systematic combinatorial techniques.53 (Some of the 
latter are related to methods proposed by Simon.)
(2) Designers need to know which “futures” (proposed 
changes) constitute improvements and which do not, and for whom. 
Thus, designers must acknowledge and take into account the visions 
of people affected by a proposal, and the science for design must 
support the requisite second-order understanding. Associated 
methods include the use of fiction, interview techniques and focus 
groups, observation of user behavior, analysis of think-aloud 
protocols recording user interaction with artifacts, ethnography, and 
participatory design.54
(3) Second-order understanding (e.g., obtained by the 
methods just identified) should inform design decisions. Describing 
this feature, Krippendorff contrasts design with engineering: 
“Engineering has it easy,” he says, because it “is concerned [only] 
with the functional aspect of technology” and therefore does not 
require any second-order understanding, whereas design methods 
must be concerned with the users’ understanding, and with social 
aspects of artifacts. The methods associated with this feature are 
design methods proper; they focus on how stakeholders attribute 
meanings to artifacts, and “at least in principle,” they render design 
proposals that are empirically testable (or rather, that can be evaluated, 
because “a projected future cannot yet be observed” [see item 1]). 
Krippendorff sketches “five proven methods” of this kind.55 One of 
them, for example, is about “designing artifacts that are informative 
(expressive) of their workings.”
(4) Designers need a rhetorical understanding on which to 
base the validity of their claims about design proposals. Rather than 
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making feeble appeals to aesthetic sensitivities and unsupported 
predictions of cultural trends, or borrowing validity criteria from 
other disciplines, designers should be able to rely on the science 
for design to provide ways for them to “substantiate the claims 
made for their designs.” Such “semantic claims” must convince 
“skeptical stakeholders about the virtue of a design”56 and, as noted 
under item 1, they always concern the future. In contrast to claims 
of engineering, a designer’s semantic claims are not justifiable by 
mathematical theories, and Krippendorff lists five ways (if not 
exactly methods) of convincing the skeptical stakeholders.57 For 
example, “methodological validity” consists of a critical examination 
of the design process that led the designer to a proposal, in analogy 
to a natural scientist’s critical examination of the circumstances 
under which an experimental result was obtained.
(5) Apart from critically investigating design from within 
and supplying designers with “reliable concepts, methods, and 
knowledge,” the science for design “has to sustain the viability of 
its own discourse”—but not through a philosophy of science, for a 
“philosopher of science who would target the science for design is 
condemned to remain outside it and therefore [to remain] only of 
marginal importance to designers.”58 The science for design should be 
both “a science of making and a philosophy of realizing artifacts with and 
for others.” Apparently, the notion of the “viability of discourse” is to 
the entire practice of the design profession what “validity of claims” 
is to the particular design project (see item 4). The methods proposed 
to ensure viability59 include systematic collection of experience from 
successes and failures of projects, scholarly documentation of design 
discourse, institutionalization of design research, and self-reflection 
in collaboration with relevant stakeholders to ensure that design 
research develops its own research paradigm.
As should be clear by now, there are significant parallels 
among Simon, Schön, and Krippendorff. While Simon and Schön 
open their discussion by thoroughly criticizing the status and role 
of professions in society, Krippendorff’s critique of the design 
profession is equally acute, only more implicit. It surfaces in the form 
of occasional warnings about making unsupported claims, uncrit-
ically adopting research paradigms from other fields, mimicking 
natural science, or surrendering one’s territory of expertise to other 
disciplines. Krippendorff’s ideas on the validity of semantic claims 
(see item 4) are crucial to the project of ensuring academic respect-
ability through instrumental theory (“science for design”). It seems 
to be analogous to, but far more level-headed than, Simon’s “hard” 
program of achieving academic respectability by forcing design 
theory to fit computerization, or indeed Schön’s “soft” endorsement 
of practitioners’ “on-the-spot experiments” as a yardstick of 
theoretical rigor.
But there are significant differences as well. Where Simon 
focused on the prospective artifact as a system, and on technical 
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methods for determining it, Schön introduced the designer as 
a human element, and Krippendorff expands the scope of his 
foundational theory—partly by extending the range of designed 
artifacts under consideration and partly by including other relevant 
stakeholders in addition to the designer.60 This extreme degree of 
human-centeredness and the central position accorded to the notions 
of meaning and second-order understanding are probably what lead 
Krippendorff, in one important respect, to narrow the scope of his 
instrumental design theory: As noted, he draws a sharp distinction 
between design and engineering, excluding the latter form consid-
eration. Indeed, Krippendorff seems to endorse the somewhat 
simplistic view succinctly rendered by Owen: “In simplistic 
terms, it is sometimes said, ‘designers work with thing-to-people 
relationships, engineers work with thing-to-thing relationships.’”61 In 
contrast, Horváth’s survey and classification of topics in engineering 
design research readily accommodate them both:62 thing-to-people 
relationships and thing-to-thing relationships.
Discussion: What is the Foundational–Instrumental Relationship?
As we have seen, Simon, Schön, and Krippendorff have contributed 
to design as an intellectual and academic discipline by assuming 
a foundational design theory and suggesting instrumental design 
theory, albeit without making that distinction. However, their instru-
mental theories would point in very different directions if consulted 
by a designer for practical guidance.
Is it because their foundational theories are logically 
incompatible and therefore entail incompatible instrumental 
theories? The answer is negative, in that a foundational theory is 
not literally an axiom system, and an instrumental theory is not a 
system of theorems that follow by deduction. Simon, for instance, 
might have maintained his position that design is essentially a 
matter of problem solving in planning the improvement of existing 
situations, without being forced to conclude that such problems be 
solved mathematically or computationally.
Nor are the basic tenets of Simon’s, Schön’s, and 
Krippendorff’s foundational theories logically incompatible. Design 
as problem solving could, conceivably, be conducted as a Schönian 
“conversation with the materials of a situation” (although frequently 
redefining “command variables” would be cumbersome), while also 
being conceived of as a search among numerous prospective artifacts 
that are anticipated to make sense to their stakeholders, along the 
lines of Krippendorff’s “semantic turn.”
Judging from these observations of the foundational theories 
in Simon, Schön, and Krippendorff, it would seem that, by way 
of answer to our first focus question (see the introduction), the 
relationship between foundational theories and the instrumental 
theories that emerge from them is not well-defined at all; it is rather 
too subtle—or merely too fluid—to be described in precise terms of 
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logic. Perhaps the adequacy of the three sample foundational theories 
for supporting powerful instrumental theory is best described 
metaphorically—in terms of the potential a flashlight might have for 
lighting up a dark room. The clarity and concentration of the beam 
of light it emits determine what we see, but only up to a point, for 
very much of what we see depends on where we point it.
Thus, even though in hindsight we may consider Simon’s 
instrumental theory a dead end, and therefore tend to reject his 
foundational theory of design as problem solving, we should ask 
ourselves if this rejection is justified. Is it possible, after all, that 
nothing was wrong with the idea of design as problem solving, but 
only with the particular way Simon used it as a flashlight in the 
darkness—and with the way many of us pointed it in the wrong 
direction as well?
In comparison, Schön’s flashlight may seem a bit dim 
(powered as it is by a low-wattage idea of design proceeding by 
trial and error); yet he managed to light up what Simon missed: 
the human power of creativity. However, this fresh insight does not 
exhaust the potential of Schon’s flashlight; as noted, “frame analysis” 
was one of the more promising possibilities he suggested.
The beam of light from Krippendorff’s flashlight is bright 
and firmly directed toward the stakeholders of design. It appears to 
reveal bits and pieces of an answer to the practitioner’s request for 
guidance. However, its light is oddly monochromatic and, no matter 
where we might point it, it lights up only the meanings involved 
in thing-to-people relationships. The thing-to-thing relationships it 
leaves in the dark—with the engineers.
Discussion: What is “GOOD” Foundational Theory?
What the readings would suggest is that instrumental theories might 
well be affected by one’s foundational theories, but in rather obscure 
ways. Furthermore, foundational theory tends to be stipulated 
without justification regarding its usefulness in supporting instru-
mental theory. Thus, when it comes to answering our second focus 
question, about what a good foundational theory is, we are at a loss 
for guiding principles.
Once more, let us turn to a lighting metaphor for help. 
When deciding how to light a room, generally the recommendation 
is to distinguish among and combine three kinds of lighting: (1) 
general lighting to provide overall illumination that allows you to 
walk about the room safely; (2) task lighting for more concentrated 
illumination where you perform certain kinds of recurring activities 
(e.g., cooking, reading, sewing, etc.); and (3) the occasional accent 
lighting, to provide visual interest or drama to the room by locally 
highlighting particular features (e.g., the texture of a wall, drapery, 
or prized possessions, such as a painting or a house plant).63
If the problem with current major foundational design 
theories is that they work somewhat erratically, like flashlights 
63 American Lighting Association, 
“Lighting your life” (2009). http://
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info_lighting3.php (accessed February 10, 
2009).
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lighting up only what they happen to be pointed at, then perhaps 
we should begin to look for foundational theories that work more 
like, say, a ceiling lamp that provides general lighting to the room of 
design. The light source of such a theoretical fixture would be a good 
definition of design—one that is not unduly colored by values and 
that illuminates the subject matter that our instrumental theories 
should address to serve design as a professional and intellectual 
discipline. However, it should illuminate nothing beyond that subject 
matter.
The instrumental theories, on the other hand, should work 
by analogy to task or accent lighting: like task lighting if they are 
intended to support a particular type of design task (e.g., graphic 
design or design of databases, furniture, diesel engines, sculptural 
ceramics, or organizations), and like accent lighting if they are 
intended to draw useful lessons from the study of individual cases 
(e.g., prized possessions, such as the Life & Work of Jørn Utzon, 
or the success of Philippe Starck’s “Juicy Saliff” lemon squeezer). 
This elaborate metaphor of task and accent lighting is a conjecture 
that I pursue no further here. As an afterthought to our discussion 
in the previous section of our first focus question, the metaphor 
explains how instrumental theories might fit into and supplement a 
foundational theory, whose purpose (more to the point of the present 
section), is to endow the entire body of theory with some measure 
of unity and to determine what should count as design research and 
what should not.
In terms of the lighting metaphor, our concern here is the 
notion of a foundational theory that works like a fixture for general 
lighting, with a definition of design as its source of light. Of the 
three theorists whose work we have reviewed, only Simon offers an 
explicit definition: design as devising courses of action for “changing 
existing situations into preferred ones.” Persuasively elegant though 
it is, it covers many situations that are obviously irrelevant to 
design research or design as a profession. For example, it includes 
as “design” the neighbor’s cat planning when and from where to 
jump at the mouse she has spotted in my garden, or me contem-
plating an impulse to kick off my shoes under the conference table 
because my feet are getting hot. As we saw, Simon overcompensated 
for this hyper-generality by, metaphorically speaking, encapsulating 
his definition in a dark lampshade with a single narrow opening 
toward formally specified constraint satisfaction and optimization 
problems.
Any definition of design focuses attention on a particular 
range of phenomena, and the less “shading” we need to add 
subsequently to modify that range, the better. Still, there is no 
fact of the matter that dictates a single “correct” definition. As 
Buchanan once put it, “battles over the correct definition of design 
are fruitless.” But we should recognize “that definitions serve the 
purpose of shaping a particular line of inquiry and that the field 
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will be vital as long as definitions come and go [...].”64 However, as I 
have argued elsewhere,65 too much coming and going of definitions 
may disintegrate the body of design theory and compromise 
the credibility of design research. In addition, developing one’s 
definition(s) of design in a more principled way than picking 
whatever might provoke a lively debate is surely possible. I would 
suggest that definitions of design be developed according to the 
following criteria:
(1) Public acceptability. The definition should resonate 
intuitively with the use of the word “design” in common parlance, 
as well as in relevant professional, educational, and research organi-
zations. (Otherwise, communication is hampered by confusion.)
(2) Suitable coverage. The definition should cover a range of 
phenomena that is neither too narrow nor too broad (or hetero-
geneous) for the concept of design to be useful as a tool for thinking. 
(If too little is covered, the concept is seldom relevant; if too much is 
covered, attributing the concept to a particular phenomenon conveys 
very little meaning.)
(3) Explorative potential: The definition should explicate 
design in terms of other concepts that suggest fruitful avenues of 
research and understanding. (This potential may be dispensable but 
is obviously desirable.)
Even so, Buchanan is right that there is no single “correct” 
definition. However, in the interests of unity and credibility, 
we should use these (or similar) criteria in making an effort to 
converge—if not on a single definition, then on at most a small 
handful of alternative definitions, representing whatever genuine 
disagreement may exist among competing schools of thought. To 
illustrate my point, let me suggest a definition and briefly evaluate 
it according to the criteria.
Design: Creatively proposing an idea,66 so as to enable 
yourself or others to make an artifact according to the idea.67 
Following Hilpinen, I take an artifact to be “an object [not necessarily 
material] that has been intentionally made or produced for a certain 
purpose.”68
To argue for the public acceptability of this definition, I would 
point out that it does not imply actual making of an artifact. This 
circumscription is quite in accordance with common parlance, where 
“design” is used not only in cases where an artifact is eventually 
made, but also in cases where a designer merely proposes an artifact, 
as is often the case for students of architecture. Furthermore, I believe 
the definition corresponds well to what people of various professions 
do who call themselves “designers,” and to what students learn to 
do when taught to “design,” whether for engineering or for more 
artistically based disciplines. No doubt there are good reasons to 
differentiate the various design professions, but there are good 
reasons, too, for clearly conceptualizing and addressing what they 
have in common: in Margolin’s words, “to define new points of 
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contiguity and to facilitate greater collaboration between different 
types of designers while making it possible for individual designers 
to address a greater range of problems than most now do.”69 The 
definition offered is an attempt at just that, and by the same token, 
it would appear to have suitable coverage: It does not restrict attention 
to a narrow professional specialty or product type, or to a particular 
methodological approach; nor does it, on the other hand, include 
blatantly irrelevant phenomena, such as mouse hunting or shoe 
kicking.
The explorative potential of the definition is more difficult 
to assess in advance. No doubt it is possible to define design in 
some other way, without referring, as I did, to creativity, to ideas 
of prospective artifacts, and to the purposes (be they utilitarian or 
artistic) that these artifacts should serve if eventually produced. 
But I cannot imagine that it is possible to practice or teach design 
without familiarity with these concepts. And familiarity deepens 
with exploration.
We should not forget, however, that just as it takes more than 
a light bulb to make a lamp, it takes more than a definition to make 
a foundational theory. Part of this additional material is already 
available in the literature on (the nature of) creativity, artifacts, etc.,70 
and more is likely to emerge from using the explorative potential of 
the definition (or that of other definitions). In particular, it seems to 
me that, to obtain a sufficiently deep understanding for coming up 
with a full-fledged foundational design theory, we need to address 
the vexed questions that arise from the simple fact (highlighted by 
the definition, but inescapable no matter how we define design) that 
at the time a given artifact was designed, it did not exist.71
For example, according to a widely accepted understanding 
of properties, they are always properties of some existing entity.72 
From this perspective, as long as the artifact did not exist, it could not 
have had any properties. Thus, at the time of its design, the artifact 
could not have had the particular property of serving its purpose. How 
then, could the designer know (or be confident) at that time that the 
artifact would eventually serve its purpose? Prediction rather than 
predication of properties appears to be involved, but what exactly 
does that mean, and what, if anything, makes it reliable?73 How, 
indeed, is design possible—thrusting forward, as it does, into an 
empty space of non-existence?
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